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Setting the Record Straight: 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
I have recently engaged in a scholarly exchange with Professors 
Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E. 
Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne, and Elizabeth Warren regarding the conclu-
sions they have drawn in their first report from the 2007 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project (the “First Report”).1  I wrote my critique in the spirit 
of academically vigorous exchange with the hope of providing construc-
tive commentary that would assist the First Report’s authors with their 
ongoing project.  I did not, and do not, intend the critique to be a per-
sonal attack, and I made every effort in writing the commentary to set 
forth my arguments convincingly without being strident. 
Unfortunately, the reply of Professors Lawless et al. to my critique 
mischaracterizes, misinterprets, and does not fully engage with the con-
structive commentary that I suggested.  In their conclusion, Professors 
Lawless et al. write the following: 
Professor Pardo has written some insightful and helpful pieces of 
scholarship in the bankruptcy field that we have expressly relied 
upon in our own individual research projects.  This commentary, in 
our opinion, is not one of them.  Instead of offering useful ideas of 
how to explore the available empirical data or build new data sets, 
he impugns our methodology, our logical assumptions, and our very 
understanding of BAPCPA’s means test.  With respect for our col-
                                                                                                               
† Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University.  For helpful suggestions, I am grateful to Lily 
Kahng, Jonathan Nash, Charles O’Kelley, Nina Pardo, and David Skover. 
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league, we do not find these critiques grounded in either a compel-
ling theory of the operation of the bankruptcy system or a thorough 
understanding of our data.2 
The manner in which the tone of the exchange has devolved is un-
fortunate, particularly because my goal has been for fruitful scholarly 
exchange that will sharpen future analyses of the effects of BAPCPA by 
motivating new research approaches.3  For this reason, I am writing a 
sur-reply to clarify the misperceptions and mischaracterizations of my 
commentary by Professors Lawless et al. and to demonstrate that my ar-
guments not only are grounded in a compelling theory of the operation of 
the bankruptcy system and an understanding of the First Report’s data, 
but also offer useful ideas for exploring available empirical data.  
This sur-reply will identify three of the main substantive points 
made in my critique that Professors Lawless et al. misinterpret and/or 
mischaracterize and will clarify why these original points are valid. 
II.  QUESTIONING THE ASSUMED INCOME PROFILE 
OF THE 2007 NONFILING POPULATION 
My critique of the First Report posits that one of the questionable 
assumptions upon which the Report is based is the assumption that the 
combined income profile of the 800,000 debtors who were deterred from 
filing for bankruptcy in 2007 (the “2007 deterred population”) and those 
who actually filed in 2007 (the “2007 filing population”) is similar to the 
income profile of debtors who filed in 2001 (the “2001 filing popula-
tion”).4  In reply, Professors Lawless et al. recast their assumption as one 
of “assuming that the incomes of deterred filers are indistinguishable 
from actual filers.”5  It is at this point that they misinterpret and mischar-
acterize one of the arguments that I offered to suggest that the assump-
tion is questionable: 
Does Professor Pardo offer any theories of his own regarding the 
income of the excluded [i.e., the 2007 deterred population]—how 
they might be higher . . . or lower . . . ?  He does offer, in a footnote, 
that some of the excluded filers might have been driven away by 
higher attorney’s fees after BAPCPA.  If we take that theory as cor-
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 4. Pardo, supra note 1, at 31. 
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rect, and if we posit that those with lower incomes are the ones least 
able to pay at the margin when attorney’s fees increase, then the in-
come of the excluded 800,000 should be lower than the filing popu-
lation.  This would make our findings about the regressive impact of 
BAPCPA even stronger.  Thus, not only is Professor Pardo un-
able—as we are—to construct a hypothesis under which the income 
of the excluded debtors would be higher in light of the available in-
come data that we have, but his only speculation of the matter sug-
gests that the income profiles of the excluded might be lower, which 
buttresses our conclusions.6 
Professors Lawless et al. misinterpret my argument.  In suggesting 
the theory that debtors deterred from filing in 2007 due to the increase in 
attorneys’ fees (the “2007 fee-deterred population”) would “be lower 
than that of the group of debtors deterred by the means test”7 (the “2007 
means-test-deterred population”), I did not hypothesize about the extent 
by which the income of the means-test-deterred population would exceed 
that of the fee-deterred population.  I did, however, argue that the exclu-
sion of a group like the fee-deterred population from the 2007 deterred 
population could alter the income distribution of the combined popula-
tion of the 2007 deterred population and the 2007 filing population.8  The 
following example suggests one possibility that undercuts the First Re-
port’s conclusion. 
The data from the First Report indicate that the average income of 
bankruptcy filers was $30,743 in 2001 and $30,863 in 2007, a difference 
that is statistically insignificant.9  Imagine that, in 2007, there were 
200,000 fee-deterred debtors and that the annual income of each debtor 
in that group was $18,200.  Also imagine that, in 2007, there were 
600,000 means-test-deterred debtors and that the annual income of each 
debtor in that group was $35,000.  Under these facts, the average income 
for the 2007 deterred population is $30,800—virtually the same as the 
2001 filing population.  If, however, one excludes the fee-deterred debt-
ors from the 2007 deterred population, the average income of the means-
test-deterred debtors is $35,000, a figure that is higher than the average 
income of the 2007 filing population.  Thus, here is one possibility where 
the average incomes of the 2001 and 2007 filing populations are the 
same, but where the average income of the subpopulation deterred by the 
means test is higher than the 2007 filing population.  Hopefully, this ex-
ample (1) clarifies why I originally had doubts about their assumption 
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and (2) corrects the mischaracterization made by Professors Lawless et 
al. that the assumption “is actually somewhat consistent with predictions 
Professor Pardo himself makes elsewhere in his critique.”10 
III.  FRAMING THE APPROPRIATE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Yet another ground on which I critique the First Report is the man-
ner in which it framed its research question for answering whether 
BAPCPA’s means test failed.  I suggested in my commentary that “any 
evaluation of whether the means test has been a success would, at a min-
imum, need to consider its effects on the filing population that it has tar-
geted—specifically, by examining the dismissal and conversion of Chap-
ter 7 cases under the abuse-dismissal framework.”11  Professors Lawless 
et al. describe my critique as an accusation that they “misconceive the 
true role and function of the means test and, as such, embark upon a 
fool’s errand with [their] Report.”12  (Along the same lines, they state 
that “[t]he thrust of Professor Pardo’s commentary, however, is his sec-
ond point—that we simply ‘don’t get’ the means test.”13  It is disturbing 
that they place the phrase “don’t get” in quotation marks.  It suggests that 
I used such language in my critique, which I did not.) 
Nowhere in my critique do I suggest that it is not worthwhile to in-
vestigate the deterrent effect of the means test.  To the contrary, I posit 
that a comprehensive analysis of the means test does require an inquiry 
into its deterrent effect.14  My criticism is that, by not considering the 
operative effect of the means test (i.e., its effects as a mechanism for case 
administration), the result is “an incomplete analysis of the effectiveness 
of the means test.”15  Stating that the First Report’s analysis is incom-
plete is a far cry from suggesting that the Report constitutes a fool’s er-
rand.  In fact, it completely misrepresents my expressed belief that deter-
rence is a necessary component of any evaluation of the means test’s 
success (as is the test’s operative effect).  If one is going to make sweep-
ing conclusions such as “BAPCPA’s much-touted means test was a fail-
ure,”16 then one must explore the test’s efficacy in all relevant regards, 
including the test’s operative effect. 
                                                                                                               
 10. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 47–48 (citing Pardo, supra note 1, at 30 
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 11. Pardo, supra note 1, at 33–34. 
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Professors Lawless et al., however, dismiss my suggestion of ex-
ploring the means test’s operative effect, suggesting that it is an invalid 
research question: 
We hold to our understanding of the means test and the concomitant 
research questions it generates.  With respect, Professor Pardo’s al-
ternative strikes us as naïve because it assumes that all debtors (and 
their lawyers) simply file their cases and then wait to see if they 
pass the means test.  We think nothing of the sort occurs.  Rather, 
debtors who know they will flunk the means test simply are advised 
not to file—and do not file—in chapter 7.  It is whimsical to suggest 
that they do file, presumably checking the box to indicate that they 
flunk the means test, and then wait for their dismissal (perhaps hop-
ing they’ll slip through the cracks?).17 
Professors Lawless et al. misstate my critique.  Nowhere do I argue 
that lawyers and their clients blindly file for Chapter 7 relief hoping that 
the means test will work out in their favor.  Quite the opposite, I ex-
pressly state that debtor attorneys will counsel their clients not to file for 
bankruptcy in those instances where the clients would be deemed ineligi-
ble for Chapter 7 relief on the basis of abuse (whether via the means test 
or otherwise).18 
An inquiry into the operative effect of the means test is a worth-
while research question because of the inherent uncertainty and ambigu-
ity in applying the means test,19 a point that I raised in my critique.20  
Because of this uncertainty and ambiguity, it is reasonable to conclude 
that many attorneys and their debtor clients will file for Chapter 7 relief 
with the good-faith belief that they do not run afoul of the means test but 
may nonetheless end up facing a dismissal motion due to a different ex-
pectation of outcome by the moving party.  Herein lies the significance 
of studying the operative effect of the means test.  BAPCPA’s means test 
marked a transition away from a standard-based to a rule-based approach 
for defining abuse of the bankruptcy system.  But as I have observed 
elsewhere, a great deal of judicial discretion persists under this rule-
                                                                                                               
 17. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 49. 
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could have on his or her client’s eligibility for Chapter 7 relief—if not because the attorney looks out 
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tute an abuse of Chapter 7.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 482–84 (2007). 
 20. See Pardo, supra note 1, at 35 (citing Pardo, supra note 19, at 482–84). 
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based approach.21  One might ask, therefore, whether the means test has 
effectively curbed the “great deal of variance [that] characterized courts’ 
assessment of the level of surplus future income that would trigger a 
finding of substantial abuse,”22 the pre-BAPCPA standard for dismissing 
a case on the basis of abuse of the bankruptcy system.23 
Interestingly, Professors Lawless et al. refer to the inherent uncer-
tainty in application of the means test to refute my point that “[h]igh-
income debtors need not worry about the means test provided that they 
have a level of disposable income that is insufficient to trigger the pre-
sumption of abuse under the means test.”24  They state that “[t]he means 
test gauntlet subjects debtors to pervasive judicial and creditor scrutiny 
and opens the door to objections whose resolutions can render a debtor 
ineligible for chapter 7.”25  They conclude: “Suffice it to say our sense of 
realism under the means test differs from his; perhaps he has a stronger 
belief in the legal clarity of BAPCPA’s deductions, the ease with which 
the expenses can be calculated and verified, or the fortitude of debtor 
nerves.”26 
Yet again, here is a mischaracterization that requires correction.  As 
already stated, I believe interpretation of the means test to be fraught 
with uncertainty.27  The example I gave merely contemplated a situation 
where the debtor would know that he or she passes the means test be-
cause of low disposable income and would therefore not have to worry 
about ineligibility for Chapter 7 relief on the basis of the means test’s 
presumption of abuse.  Nowhere did my statement indicate how the deb-
tor would arrive at the low disposable-income figure.  Professors Law-
less et al. assumed that I envisioned an easy case of passing the means 
test on the basis of expense deductions allowed under the means test.28  
But this is not at all what I had in mind.  There are scenarios that are 
much more clear cut.  For example, an above-median income debtor ow-
ing a high amount of priority tax debt may pass the means test if the 
monthly payments on such debt exceeded his or her current monthly in-
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 27. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
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come.29  Surely there are situations where the amount of priority tax debt 
owed by the debtor would not be disputed by any party such that the deb-
tor could be confident about passing the means test.30 
In any event, in the same way it is reasonable for Professors Law-
less et al. to envision a scenario where “debtors who know they will 
flunk the means test”31 will not file for Chapter 7 relief, so too is it rea-
sonable for me to have envisioned a scenario where the debtor knows he 
passes the means test.  These are the cases at the extremes.  In the middle 
are the cases with uncertainty where some debtors will file believing that 
chances are more likely than not that they have passed the means test.  
While an abuse dismissal may materialize, it may nonetheless be worth-
while for the debtor to file given the reward of a discharge that awaits if 
the debtor survives the motion (if brought).  Again, it is in these cases 
where we ought to care about the means test’s operative effect. 
Despite conceding in their reply the inherent uncertainty in the ap-
plication of the means test, Professors Lawless et al. dismiss my sugges-
tion to study the operative effect of the means test by analogizing to their 
hypothetical “‘Litigation Masculinization Reform Act’ [LMRA] that re-
quires any civil complaint filed by a female plaintiff to be dismissed.”32  
Through this hypothetical analogy, they impute to me the approach they 
think I would take to researching the effects of the LMRA and attempt to 
portray me in an unfavorable light as someone who would pursue inap-
propriate research questions.  Their simplistic analogy, however, merely 
serves to reinforce my original point: Professors Lawless et al. “could 
have delineated the manner in which BAPCPA amended the Bankruptcy 
Code and how those statutory changes would be expected to affect a deb-
tor’s evaluation of his or her choices in considering (1) whether to file 
for bankruptcy and (2) the chapter of relief under which the debtor would 
file.”33 
The LMRA analogy is inapt because it involves a single bright-line 
rule that considerably reduces discretion (albeit not completely).34  In 
                                                                                                               
 29. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (setting forth the means test); id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv) 
(providing rule for calculating monthly payment of priority claims); id. § 507(a)(8) (setting forth tax 
claims entitled to priority). 
 30. Similarly, one could imagine a scenario where a debtor’s monthly secured debt payments 
are sufficiently high to negate a debtor’s current monthly income, thus eliminating the possibility of 
the presumption of abuse arising under the means test.  See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (providing rule for 
calculating average monthly payments of secured debts). 
 31. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 49. 
 32. Id. at 50. 
 33. Pardo, supra note 1, at 34. 
 34. What result when a complaint is filed by a female plaintiff on behalf of a male plaintiff, or 
vice versa? What result when a complaint is filed by a male plaintiff who subsequently undergoes a 
transgender operation before the litigation has concluded?  And so on and so forth. 
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stark contrast, the means test (a rule) is part of a broader statutory 
framework to evaluate whether a Chapter 7 filing by an individual debtor 
can be dismissed on the basis of abuse (a standard).  The means-test pre-
sumption of abuse can be rebutted by showing “special circumstances”35 
(a standard).  Thus, above-median debtors who initially flunk the means 
test may be able to stay in the system by rebutting the presumption.  In 
cases where the presumption of abuse does not arise or is rebutted, the 
court must consider whether “the totality of the circumstances . . . of the 
debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse”36 (a standard).  Thus, 
below-median debtors who are not subject to the means test may none-
theless be kicked out of the system.  The precursor to this framework for 
analyzing abuse of the bankruptcy system by Chapter 7 debtors was 
“substantial abuse”37 (a standard), a term which the Bankruptcy Code did 
not define.  Thus, part of the legislative push for the framework shift was 
eliminating judicial discretion over these sorts of questions.  But, as al-
ready noted, discretion abounds.  And so, operative effect matters.38 
IV.  TOTAL INCOME OR DISPOSABLE INCOME? 
Finally, one of the major points on which I critique the First Report 
is its use of a debtor’s total income (or gross income)39 as a metric for 
testing the deterrent effect of the means test.  I argue that the metric is 
inappropriate because the means test focuses on disposable income rather 
                                                                                                               
 35. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B). 
 36. Id. § 707(b)(3)(B). 
 37. Id. § 707(b) (2000) (amended 2005). 
 38. Professors Lawless et al., however, remain unconvinced: “[R]ather than apologize for our 
purportedly ‘un-nuanced’ understanding of the means test, we stand by it.  We think we accurately 
comprehend what the years of legislative squabbling were all about and were consequently correct to 
focus on deterrence in framing our research questions.”  Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 
1, at 50. 
 39. Whereas I use the phrase “total income” in my critique, see Pardo, supra note 1, at 41–43,  
Professors Lawless et al. use the phrase gross income, see Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra 
note 1, at 53-57.  As I note in my critique, the First Report does not specify the source from which 
the income data were derived, and I assume, for reasons explained in my critique, that those data 
were obtained from Official Form 6I (“Schedule I—Current Income of Individual Debtor(s)”), see 
11 U.S.C. app. at 458 (2006).  See Pardo, supra note 1, at 41.  I avoid using the phrase “gross in-
come” since the first item on Schedule I requires the debtor to list “[m]onthly gross wages, salary, 
and commissions.”  Official Form 6I, 11 U.S.C. app. at 458 (2006).  Schedule I then allows a debtor 
to deduct payroll taxes, among other things, from his or her monthly gross wages.  See id.  My as-
sumption that the First Report’s income data were derived from Schedule I includes the assumption 
that the information recorded from Schedule I was the debtor’s “average monthly income,” which 
takes into account the deductions from gross wages.  See id.  Accordingly, I use the phrase “total 
income” to refer to a debtor’s “average monthly income” as reported on Schedule I (and assume that 
Professors Lawless et al. use the phrase “gross income” to refer to the same). 
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than total income.  Professors Lawless et al. defend their decision “on 
both normative and methodological grounds.”40 
Professors Lawless et al. normatively justify using total income 
based on their view that “[t]he means test has two parts: the gross income 
screen and the disposable income screen.”41  Respectfully, I disagree that 
the total-income screen is a component of the means test.  It is a limita-
tion on standing to bring an abuse dismissal motion based on the means 
test.42  But the screen itself does not test the means of the debtor to repay 
past debts from future income.43  The statutory language of the Bank-
ruptcy Code supports this view.  When Code §707(b)(2)(D) refers to 
“means testing,”44 it clearly is not referring to Code § 707(b)(7)(A), the 
total-income screen that limits standing to bring an abuse dismissal mo-
tion predicated on the means test. 
If one takes an expansive view that the total-income screen is part 
of the means test, then why not consider all of the means test, including 
the mathematical formula that determines whether a debtor has sufficient 
disposable income to trigger the presumption of abuse,45 as well as the 
provision that would allow a debtor to rebut the presumption by demon-
strating special circumstances?46  If Professors Lawless et al. insist on 
making the sweeping conclusion that “BAPCPA’s much-touted means 
test was a failure,”47 then it seems only reasonable that their analyses 
should address how all aspects of the means test (particularly the test 
itself) could shape its deterrent effect, and thus the income profile of the 
filing population. 
Professors Lawless et al. also justify on methodological grounds 
their use of total income to test the deterrent effect of the means test.  In 
doing so, they reject my suggestion to use a variable for disposable in-
come calculated as the difference between the debtor’s income (derived 
from Schedule I) and expenses (derived from Schedule J): 
                                                                                                               
 40. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 54. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7)(A) (2006) (stating that “[n]o judge, United States trustee (or 
bankruptcy administrator, if any), trustee, or other party in interest may file a motion under para-
graph (2)” with respect to a debtor whose annual income is less than or equal to the state median 
income for a family size comparable to that of the debtor’s household). 
 43. Debtors who are not subject to means testing may still be scrutinized for income-based 
repayment ability, see id. § 707(b)(3)(B), a point raised in my critique, see Pardo, supra note 1, at 
44–45, 45 n.74. 
 44. Id. § 707(b)(2)(D) (“Subparagraphs (A) through (C) shall not apply, and the court may not 
dismiss or convert a case based on any form of means testing . . . if the debtor is a disabled vet-
eran . . . and the indebtedness occurred primarily during a period during which he or she was . . . on 
active duty . . . or . . . performing a homeland defense activity . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 45. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 46. See id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 47. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 1, at 363. 
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The problem, however, with this idea is endogeneity.  Here is the 
conundrum: if a researcher attempts to work out people’s food ex-
penses, car expenses, secured debt, etc., per the means test standards 
by plucking numbers from Schedule Js in the 2001 cases, it will be 
necessary to assume that if those people had filed under a BAPCPA 
regime their reported expenses would have been identical.  But we 
cannot know that. . . .  A synthetic means-test “disposable income” 
variable constructed from 2001 cases cannot tell us reliably how 
those same debtors would have reported (and even incurred) ex-
penses in 2007.  This challenge brings us to an important point re-
garding the conduct of empirical research: investigators must make 
judgment calls based on logical inference and common sense.  
Guided by caution, we concluded that we could not be safe in con-
structing 2001 hypothetical means-test disposable income and so 
empirical prudence required staying with the more objective and 
consistent gross income measure.48 
My efforts in the critique to assuage endogeneity concerns regard-
ing a disposable-income construct were summarily dismissed by Profes-
sors Lawless et al. without engaging the substance of my analysis.49  I 
still stand by that analysis.  That said, let us assume for the sake of argu-
ment that Professors Lawless et al. are correct that the endogeneity con-
cerns they identify cannot be explained away.  If they are correct, then 
the data they offer to support their conclusion regarding the means test’s 
failure suffer from the same endogeneity concerns they raise regarding 
my disposable-income construct. 
Presumably, the income data set forth in the First Report are de-
rived from Schedule I.50  Under the abuse dismissal framework, income 
has taken on added significance post-BAPCPA.  Income is the basis for 
both (1) the total-income screen that limits standing to bring an abuse 
dismissal motion based on the means test and (2) the starting point of the 
means-test equation for determining whether a debtor has sufficient dis-
posable income to trigger the presumption of abuse.  By the logic offered 
by Professors Lawless et al., the comparison of the income profiles of the 
2001 and 2007 debtors requires us to assume that the income figures re-
ported by the 2001 debtors in their schedules would have been identical 
to the figures they would have reported in their schedules had they filed 
in 2007.  If, according to Professors Lawless et al., it would not be sound 
                                                                                                               
 48. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 55–56 (emphasis added). 
 49. See id. at 56 n.48 (“Professor Pardo . . . confronts the potential concern of endogeneity in 
the third paragraph of a multi-paged footnote. . . . We refer interested readers to that lengthy discus-
sion if so inclined; suffice it to say we are less sanguine than Professor Pardo at dismissing the en-
dogeneity issue presented.” (citation omitted)). 
 50. See supra note 39. 
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to make such an assumption with respect to Schedule J expenses, why is 
it sound to make the assumption with respect to Schedule I income?  Pro-
fessors Lawless et al. offer no justification and simply conclude that 
“empirical prudence required staying with the more objective and consis-
tent gross income measure.”51 
Added concern arises from the fact that the total-income screen and 
the means test center on the concept of “current monthly income,” which 
the Bankruptcy Code defines as the average monthly income that the 
debtor receives from all sources during one of two possible historical six-
month periods.52  As I pointed out in my critique, “[t]he fact that ‘current 
monthly income’ is based on an historical average raises the possibility 
that ‘current monthly income’ could either be higher or lower than the 
debtor’s actual monthly income at the time he or she files for bankruptcy, 
depending on whether the debtor experienced income fluctuations prior 
to filing.”53  Nowhere in the First Report do Professors Lawless et al. 
explain why, for purposes of evaluating the deterrent effect of the means 
test, it is appropriate to marshal Schedule I income data when debtors 
would rely on the “current monthly income” that would be reported in 
Official Form B22A (“Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income 
and Means-Test Calculation”)54 to ascertain eligibility for Chapter 7 re-
lief. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In writing this sur-reply, my intent has been to clarify mischarac-
terizations and misconceptions of the arguments set forth in my critique 
of the First Report.  I certainly agree with Professors Lawless et al. that 
we must all move on to more productive ventures.55  Hopefully, the clari-
fications set forth here will facilitate this. 
                                                                                                               
 51. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 55–56. 
 52. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2006). 
 53. Pardo, supra note 1, at 36. 
 54. See 11 U.S.C. app. at 533. 
 55. Lawless et al., Interpreting Data, supra note 1, at 61. 
